“Timid men prefer the calm of despotism to the tempestuous sea of liberty.”
— Thomas Jefferson
Is freedom more important than safety? From a principled libertarian standpoint—grounded in self-ownership, the non-aggression principle, and a presumption of liberty—the answer is yes.
Safety is valuable, but it is a derivative good: it matters because it serves free people pursuing their own ends. When the state elevates “safety” above liberty, history shows it routinely overshoots—chilling speech, centralizing power, and harming innocents—often with meager security gains.
The burden of proof must remain on those who would restrict liberty, and restrictions must be narrow, necessary, and temporary if imposed at all.
A principled baseline
Ethical libertarianism treats each person as a moral agent with rights to life, liberty, and property. That implies strong duties on others (especially the state) not to coerce. Security can justify state action only to prevent or redress actual rights violations—e.g., protecting people from force or fraud.
Even then, two constraints follow: (1) measures must be tightly tied to a concrete threat (necessity), and (2) they must use the least rights-restrictive means (proportionality).
When “safety” becomes an open-ended license, it predictably erodes rights.
Benjamin Franklin’s famous warning—“Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety”—comes from an actual 1755 political dispute in Pennsylvania over how to fund frontier defense without sacrificing constitutional constraints. It was not a social-media slogan; it was about refusing to trade essential liberty for temporary safety.
What history teaches when “safety” trumps liberty
1) The Alien & Sedition Acts (1798). During quasi-war with France, Congress criminalized “false, scandalous, and malicious writing” against the government. Pitched as national security, these laws quickly became tools to punish dissent. They expired or were repealed, and are now widely regarded as a civil-liberties nadir—illustrating how “security” rationales can suppress speech core to a free society.
2) Civil War habeas and military tribunals. Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of habeas corpus (later ratified in part by Congress) triggered Ex parte Merryman and a constitutional confrontation over executive power in emergencies. After the war, the Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan held that civilians cannot be tried by military tribunals when civil courts are open—reasserting that war is not a blank check for the executive.
3) Wartime speech cases. In Schenck v. United States (1919), the Court upheld convictions for anti-draft leaflets under the Espionage Act, embracing “clear and present danger.” Half a century later, Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) corrected course: speech can be punished only if intended and likely to incite imminent lawless action. This arc shows how fear-driven standards can be too permissive of censorship—and why libertarians insist on strong speech protections even in tense times.
4) Mass internment in WWII. In Korematsu v. United States (1944), the Court upheld the exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast on asserted security grounds. The decision is now infamous; later jurisprudence and public apologies make clear that “safety” claims can mask prejudice and panic. Libertarians cite Korematsu as a decisive warning against group-based preventive restrictions.
5) Post-9/11 surveillance. The USA PATRIOT Act’s Section 215 enabled broad collection of “tangible things,” which the government used to justify mass telephone-metadata programs. After Edward Snowden’s disclosures in 2013, courts and Congress scrutinized these programs; the Ninth Circuit later held the bulk collection exceeded statutory authority and likely violated the Fourth Amendment. Again: sweeping “safety” tools quietly expanded, proved constitutionally suspect, and delivered questionable marginal benefits.
6) Public health police powers. Libertarians acknowledge that some restraints can be justified to prevent direct harm (the classic Millian harm principle). In Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905), the Court upheld a smallpox vaccination mandate structured as a modest fine and grounded in then-urgent conditions. Even there, the Court stressed limits: measures cannot be “arbitrary or oppressive” and must be reasonably required for public safety. Libertarians take this to mean narrow tailoring, due process, and off-ramps for special cases—not an open invitation to permanent, sweeping controls.
Why liberty should lead
Human flourishing requires agency. Security imposed at the expense of freedom infantilizes citizens and stunts civil society’s capacity to manage risk through voluntary norms, innovation, markets (insurance, technology), and mutual aid. A culture of permission replaces responsibility.
Safety promises are routinely overbroad. Emergencies loosen political constraints, and bureaucratic incentives then entrench temporary measures. From the Sedition Act prosecutions to warrantless surveillance, powers obtained in crises rarely disappear without pushback. Milligan, Brandenburg, and the post-Snowden rulings are all course corrections—but only after damage was done.
Risk cannot be eliminated—only distributed. Centralizing risk management in the state often creates moral hazard and single points of failure. Decentralized, voluntary orders are more adaptive: they allow experimentation, feedback, and exit.
History rewards humility. The gravest rights violations—from internment to dragnet spying—were rationalized as necessary for safety. Later acknowledgment of error (or illegality) came after rights were curtailed. A libertarian ethic says: make that humility operative up front.
The libertarian test for any “safety” restriction
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Identify a concrete rights-threat, not a vague hazard. No restrictions to placate panic or punish unpopular ideas. (Schenck shows the danger; Brandenburg shows the fix.)
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Necessity & evidence. The measure must demonstrably address the threat; speculative benefits are insufficient. (Moalin and subsequent scrutiny of Section 215 revealed overstated utility.)
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Least restrictive means. Prefer targeted warrants, due process, and individualized suspicion over blanket programs. (Milligan embodies this logic in the criminal process context.)
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Temporality & sunset. Emergency powers must expire unless re-justified; transparency and legislative oversight are mandatory. (The trajectory from the PATRIOT Act to later reforms underscores why.)
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No collective punishment. Never impose burdens on entire groups based on ancestry, ideology, or status. (Korematsu stands as the cautionary tale.)
Conclusion
For libertarians, freedom ranks above safety not because risk is trivial, but because only a free society can pursue safety without sacrificing human dignity and rights.
The empirical record backs that ordering: again and again, policies sold as essential for security metastasized into censorship, surveillance, and collective punishment—later discredited by courts and history.
The correct ethical posture is a presumption of liberty, rebuttable only by clear, concrete threats; addressed with narrowly tailored, temporary, and transparent measures under strict due process.
That approach preserves both our safety and the moral architecture that makes safety worth having. Franklin’s 1755 admonition remains sound counsel in 2025.
Never give up your freedom for the illusion of safety! 👇